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Abstract: In the case Lautsi v. Italy, the European Court of Human Rights ruled twice on the validity of 
the presence of crucifixes in public school classrooms of a country where the principle of secularism 
rules. In the first judgement, the consideration of the children’s religious freedom and, implicitly, their 
best interest helped the Court to justify the prohibition of the symbols, although it was not the main 
argument for it. However, the Great Chamber revoked this decision, considering the presence of these 
symbols in classrooms adequate under the European Convention by widely applying the doctrine of the 
margin of appreciation and, additionally, ignoring the legal position and the needs of the pupils, whose 
freedom of religion was reduced to a mere object of the parental guide capacities from a very 
questionable perspective. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
On 3rd November 2009, the Second Section of the European Court of Human 
Rights (ECtHR) gave judgement in response to the lawsuit submitted against the Italian 
Republic by Ms. Soile Lautsi. The appeal was based on a breach of her freedom of 
thought and religion of art.9 of the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) and 
her right to educate their children in conformity with their own religious and moral 
beliefs recognized in art.2 of Protocol No.1. The applicant considered that the presence 
of crucifixes in Italian public school classrooms, in which their children are enrolled, is 
an "interference incompatible" with these rights and, in particular, with the principle of 
secularism in which she wants to educate their children, blaming the State for allowing 
it with its current rules2. 
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In her previous complaint before the Italian national jurisdiction, the 
Administrative Court of Veneto Region, by Judgment 1110/2005, of 17th March, 
refused to rule on the applicant's claim in relation to the violation of their rights to 
freedom of thought and religion raised in the terms of these articles of the ECHR. The 
national Court concluded the crucifix is the "symbol of the unique history, culture and 
national identity –as a characteristic immediately perceptible– and the expression of 
some of the secular principles of the community", so "legitimately can be placed in the 
public school classrooms, as not only not incompatible, but an affirmative and 
confirmatory addendum to the republican principle of the secular State"3. However, 
before adopting its final decision, the Court submitted to the Italian Constitutional Court 
a question of unconstitutionality against the applicable law in which, paradoxically, it 
argued that the crucifix is "essentially a Christian religious symbol of univocal 
confessional meaning"4. The Italian Constitutional Court finally dismissed the 
application for strictly formal reasons, without ruling on the merits5. Finally, the State 
Council, as the final appeal court in the Administrative Order, denied in 2003 the last 
Ms. Lautsi's request. Its judgement justified the presence of the crucifix as a symbol of 
civic values of the legal system that, in the cultural Italian context, is also a suitable 
representation of the values proposed by the principle of secularism6. 
 
The Second Section of the ECtHR agreed unanimously with Ms. Lautsi’s 
application, concluding that Italy had violated her right to educate her children in 
conformity with the own religions and philosophical convictions in connection with her 
freedom of thought and religion. However, the judgement was appealed to the Grand 
Chamber by the Italian Government in January 20107, and it overturned the initial 
ruling. The Great Chamber determined that there was no violation of Art.2 of the 
Protocol No. 1 and there were no separate issues that could involve a possible violation 
of Art.9 ECHR. The main argument of the Grand Chamber to overturn the first instance 
judgment was (notwithstanding the subsequent more detailed analysis) that the concrete 
content of the rules on the presence of religious symbols in public schools was a 
question that falls within the discretion or "margin of appreciation" enjoyed by each 
State onward its main obligation to respect the right of parents to ensure the education 
of their children according to their religious and philosophical convictions8, because of 
the impossibility to find a common approach to all European countries. 
 
The most obvious and general question underlying these rulings, especially the 
Great Chamber one owing to its arguments, is the existence of possible limits to the 
                                                          
3
 Administrative Regional Court for the Véneto Region, Third Section, Judgement No. 1110/2005, §16.1. 
4
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6
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rules on the relation of States with the religious phenomenon as a result of the need to 
preserve the fundamental rights of citizens. The problems about the enjoyment of 
freedom of thought and, eminently, religion, have become a challenge for modern 
societies as a result of increasing pluralism, and is a good example of how difficult it is 
for States to conciliate the constitutional principle of secularism with the religion’s 
increasing active role in the public sphere and, therefore, with its symbols (Parejo 
2010). As a question eminently subjective, the arguments employed for defending or 
refusing the different approaches are usually impregnated with a powerful ideological 
charge very complicated to get away from. 
 
The ECHR does not prejudge the different models of relationship between State 
and religion, but it imposes a duty of impartiality and neutrality that results in the 
inability to assess the legitimacy of different religious beliefs of its citizens9. This 
neutrality is an essential element for the public order and to ensure the necessary 
tolerance in democratic societies10, constituting, therefore, the starting premise for the 
free and correct exercise of individual religious freedom. Thus, this right comprises 
both the possibility to profess and express certain convictions as well as the option to 
not believe, always within the limits that a democratic society impose in order to protect 
public safety, public order, health or morals and the freedoms and rights of others. 
 
If reading all the ECtHR doctrine (at least, before the Lautsi affair) it is possible 
to say that neutrality is desirable in those States that opt for the principle of secularism 
to govern its relations with the religion, but also in those who have institutionalized any 
form of enhanced relationship with one or several confessions11. In both situations, the 
public authorities must not take an active role in the promotion of certain religious 
values; they should only ensure a peaceful coexistence between different religious and 
philosophical options. The religious phenomenon should always be channeled into 
concrete rules in order to ensure a real pluralism and respect for the rights of all citizens. 
 
However, that role of neutral guardian is not easy to play. It is not easy to 
determine when the public expression of a religion, particularly of religious symbols 
shared by the majority or not, violates the rights of other people. For this reason, the 
ECtHR has usually turned to the doctrine of the margin of appreciation when possible. 
However, the different judgements about religious symbols in public space share similar 
                                                          
9
 Leyla Şahin v. Turkey [GC], no. 4474/98, §105, ECHR 2005-XI. 
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combined interpretation of various provisions of the Italian Constitution. According to Mancini (2010), 
this principle does not mean indifference towards religion but the equidistance and impartiality regarding 
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conclusions, and the arguments and principles employed to base them have been only 
slightly different until the second Lautsi ruling, whose argumentative diversity shows an 
important rupture. The Court had always maintained a secular approach in their final 
decisions (Gibson 2009), which has not prevented it to be accused to employ this 
doctrine in favor of Christian values and against the Islamists ones because the final 
conclusion was always that neutrality should be imposed on these (Mancini 2010). 
 
Apart from evaluative judgments on involved religious beliefs, if the judgement 
of the Grand Chamber is compared with the similar precedents, a clear change in the 
Court’s priorities is visible. In previous pronouncements, including the first in Lautsi, 
the children’s freedom of thought and religion has been, more or less, considered a right 
that can be breached by a religious expression in a public educational context12, but the 
Great Chamber only pays attention to the parents’ rights and its relation with the margin 
of appreciation of the States. Without providing arguments, the negative freedom of 
religion of those who are directly exposed to the religious symbol is discarded as a 
valuable element of judgement. 
 
This position is not compatible with the idea that children’s rights are 
autonomous ones, different from the rights of the parents. The freedom of thought and 
religion of the children is closely related to the adults’ freedom to choose the religious 
and moral education of them, but is a right with a specific object of protection: the 
formation of their conscience, an objective that should be achieved mainly through the 
education and considering the “children’s best interest” as the essential and basic 
principle for it. The Lautsi affair was an opportunity to establish the protection 
guidelines for this right at the supranational level, so it is important to know whether the 
different arguments and conclusions of both rulings have any consequence on its 
configuration under the ECHR, but not as an isolated right but regarding the parents’ 
formative rights and the principle of the children’s best interest. 
 
The doctrine who has studied the Lautsi judgements has not given more than a 
secondary treatment to the right of children. Authors are mainly focused in the debate 
about the implementation and the scope given to the margin of appreciation in the case 
of religious symbols in the public space, the value and the power of them or the 
meaning and consequences of the principle of secularism. There are hardly mentions of 
the presence of children’s freedom of thought and religion as a component of Court’s 
arguments13. 
 
Given this situation, the main objective of this article is not to study in-depth all 
theoretical questions of the Lautsi judgements, but just to identify how the freedom of 
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 Aside from some arguments of the Second Section judgement in the Lautsi affair, this point of view can 
be found in Dahlab v. Switzerland (dec.), no. 42393/98, ECHR 2001-V, and Dogru v. France, no. 
27058/05, 4th March 2009, where the Court expressly rejects to assess the complaint under the art.2 of the 
Protocol No.1. 
13
 Among the consulted authors, only Barrero (2012, p.382-385) identifies the presence of the negative 
dimension of children’s religious freedom as a part of the arguments employed by the ECtHR in the first 
Lautsi judgement, as a part of a wider analysis of the case law. 
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thought and religion of children is considered in each one. It is important also to check 
if the Court conclusions are useful to configure a set of rules for its international 
protection at the European regional level. 
 
II. THE CHILDREN’S BEST INTEREST AND THE FREEDOM OF THOUGHT AND RELIGION 
 
The identification of children as subjects of fundamental rights has many 
problems due to their subjective particularities. Unlike adults, whose full legal capacity 
makes them the natural owners of the protective mechanisms guaranteed by the rights, 
children have traditionally been seen as vulnerable subjects needed of protection and 
guidance, humans in development process incapable of acting autonomously. This point 
of view changed after the Second World War, when the idea of the principle of human 
dignity as the foundation of the legal order above all individual considerations leaded to 
consider also children as subjects of fundamental rights, as a way to channel their 
personal development, on a basis of equality with adults (Asensio 2006). 
 
Just because his developing personality, the child is "a creditor of a special 
protection mandate that justifies the need to protect the evolutionary process" in which 
he is immersed (Valero 2009: p.48). In response to this peculiarity, the legal status of 
the children’s fundamental rights cannot be the same as the adults’ one, suffering a 
restriction on their capacity to exercise them according to their maturity. 
 
For this reason, these rights are regulated in specific legal instruments, based in 
their own substantive principles. At international level, and with general scope, 
children’s rights are recognized in a specific international treaty, the UN Convention on 
the Rights of the Child of 198914. This text comprises in an integrated and organized 
manner all the children’s rights, resulting in a legal code distinguished by its specific 
target group. The only particular feature of the Convention is that its beneficiaries are a 
concrete group defined by its age, which covers, provisionally, all humans at a concrete 
stage of their life (Galinsoga 2002). For the Convention, underage people are 
individuals with the right to a physic, intellectual and social development and, therefore, 
they are holders of both the Convention’s rights and those regulated in any other 
international treaty. Thus, the underage child is conceived as an active subject of rights, 
independent and direct holder thereof, not requiring any intermediaries for exercising 
them; it is assumed, as initial premise, that the rights and interests of children will not 
necessary be the same as those of their parents or guardians (Puente 2001). 
 
At European regional level, there is no a specific text regulating all children’s 
rights. The European Convention on the Exercise of Children's Rights of 1996 is 
focused in procedural rights, so it has a limited material scope. Additionally, there are 
other legal provisions dedicated to children, noteworthy of which are the arts.7 and 17 
of the European Social Charter, that ensure the right of children and adolescents to a 
special protection against physical, social and moral dangers to which they are exposed 
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(particularly against those consequence of their condition of workers) and the right to an 
adequate social, legal and financial protection respectively. The text also ensures their 
protection indirectly through other articles referred to the protection of maternity or 
family. 
 
Along with the children’s autonomy, the main principle and interpretative key of 
the Convention on the Rights of the Child, according to the UN Committee on the 
Rights of the Child, is their “best interest”. In the sphere of the Council of Europe, this 
concept appears in the art.1.2 of the European Convention on the Exercise of Children's 
Rights as the main purpose of the text, and it is also mentioned tangentially in other 
instruments15. Despite this principle is not established with general scope at European 
level, it is reasonable to think the children’s best interest is fully integrated in the ECHR 
a finalist guideline16, operating as a specific mechanism to ensure the dignity of a 
concrete collective. This conclusion is the result of a combined reading of the European 
Social Charter, the proclamation of the universal ownership of human rights made by 
the art.1 ECHR and the general prohibition of discrimination of the art.1 of Protocol 
No.12. The ECtHR itself did not hesitate to confirm or set some limits to the 
educational activities or curricular contents through measures clearly oriented to protect 
this best interest, as will be shown below. 
 
The idea of the “best interest” suggests that underage people, because of their 
physical and intellectual immaturity, need a special protection even beyond their 
autonomy in order to become a citizen in the future. Despite its importance, this generic 
and formal standpoint shows a very complicated operability. It is a legal standard of 
dynamic nature, because it evolves according to the subject’s circumstances, with a 
strong ethical dimension, circumstances that make its practical application not easy 
(Rivero 2000). The children’s best interest is an undefined legal concept that cannot be 
delimitated in the abstract, but should be materialized in each case by weighing the 
different interests involved and the specific current circumstances. Anyway, their best 
interest must always be the final object of the rules affecting children. 
 
This is a very important principle for Civil Law, but this is not its only scope of 
application. It also constitutes an important teleological interpretative standard for 
fundamental rights, because it allows the evaluation of possible violations when there 
are children implicated. In this role, the idea of children’s best interest coincides with 
the principles of human dignity and free development of the personality (Valero 2009), 
since it puts the child in the position of a subject of rights, refusing the notion that he is 
                                                          
15
 The art.6 ECHR establishes the “interests of juveniles” as a limit for the trial publicity. The art.5 of 
Protocol No.7 allows the Governments to take “such measures as are necessary in the interests of the 
children” related to the circumstances of his parents’ marriage. 
16
 See “The principle of the best interests of the child – What it means and what it demands from adults”, 
lecture pronounced by Thomas Hammarberg, Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council of Europe, 
in Warsaw on May 2008. Accessible in:  
https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?Ref=CommDH/Speech(2008)10&Language=lanEnglish&Ver=original
&Site=&BackColorInternet=DBDCF2&BackColorIntranet=FDC864&BackColorLogged=FDC864 
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a simply object of them (Joyal 199117). From this perspective, it is possible to establish 
an essential relationship between the children’s best interest and their freedom of 
thought and religion, because this fundamental right is oriented, particularly, to protect 
the free configuration of the subjective moral and personal parameters. 
 
Although the children’s best interest and their freedom of thought and religion 
are inseparable and complementary, they are two different questions. Not all 
interference in the child’s conscience will be contrary to his best interest. There will be 
incompatible to this principle only those which may disrupt his moral value system 
affecting his future autonomy, so the child would not develop freely. Likewise, every 
measure of ideological discrimination against a child must be considered, as well a 
violation of a fundamental right, as incompatible with his interest, because can 
constitute a coactive measure intended to make him assume certain ideas different from 
his own or his parents’ ones.  
 
The third element in the equation of the children’s best interest is the right to 
education. First of all, as the primary mechanism to inculcate the concrete values that 
allow children to develop their individual personalities. Secondly, as the instrument the 
state recognizes to adults for rightfully influencing their children’s convictions. This 
second dimension of education makes, in practice, the children’s freedom of thought 
and religion to be controlled by their parents, existing the risk of identifying  the 
children’s best interest with the parents’ one, which is not correct. 
 
Looking at the rules, according to art.5 of the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child the parents have the duty of providing “appropriate direction and guidance in the 
exercise by the child of the rights recognized” according to his evolving capacities; this 
is a clause oriented to prevent abuse and impositions from parents, also applicable to the 
freedom of thought and religion. Then, when the art.14 of this Convention restricts the 
exercise of the child’s freedom of conscience according to his capacities and under the 
parental direction is not allowing parents to make their sons and daughters to adopt their 
ideas, but to advise and protect them in their educational process according to their 
moral criteria. Even though there is no specific mention to the child’s freedom of 
thought and religion in the Council of Europe texts, the Protocol No.2 of the ECHR 
(art.2) recognizes the right for parents to have their children educated in accordance 
with their religious and philosophical views. But, according to the above international 
rules, this cannot be conceived as an absolute right. The freedom of conscience is 
recognized for children under the general mention of art.9 ECHR and, if limited as a 
consequence of their lack of maturity, it should be respected and protected as a right to 
maintain certain convictions, to change them and to not to be compelled to do it, always 
under the parental guidance. 
 
An excessive interpretation of parental rights, which puts adults’ convictions 
over the education in freedom, involves the denial of child’s autonomy and personality 
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and, above all, voids the content of his freedom of thought and religion, not respecting 
his best interest. It is true that, as a consequence of the situation of dependence in which 
is involved and the subjective content of his interest, child’s rights cannot operate as an 
absolute limit for the parents or mentors. But, in line with the superior consideration of 
the children’s best interest as a projection of their dignity, the purpose of the parental 
guidance is just helping children to achieve the future autonomy thanks to a 
comprehensive education oriented to their particular benefit. As an instrument of 
parents and public authorities to protect children against negative or not desirable 
impacts, the right of moral guidance should be exercised at the service of pupil’s 
freedom of conscience. In other words, it has to look for their best interest. 
 
For this purpose, the public authorities have a complementary role of the 
parents’ primary obligation. The state, through the educative administration, is the 
guardian of the formation of future citizens in the most delicate stage of their life, when 
their conviction system is more vulnerable. In order to correctly implement the right to 
education, the state should create a neutral environment that allows every child to 
develop his specific interest without any other interference than the legitimated ones. In 
education, in its broadest sense, moral or evaluative elements will always be present, 
and sometimes it will be difficult to determine when they are appropriate to ensure the 
children’s best interest. However, as a guideline, one can assume that the required 
values are only those which permit the child to improve his critical judgment according 
to his evolution, promoting present and future personal freedom. Every other moral 
content should be judged according to its incidence on the children’s best interest 
through the two recognized rights. First, the right of the parents to have their children 
educated in accordance with their moral parameters, which will not be violated while 
the transmission of ideologically charged content is done in an objective, critical and 
pluralistic manner, avoiding any proselytizing intention (Valero 2009). And, above all, 
the freedom of thought and religion of children, which benefits if there is a plurality of 
objective educational contents and perspectives presented on equal terms. 
 
III. THE PRESENCE OF THE CHILD’S FREEDOM OF THOUGHT AND RELIGION IN THE 
ARGUMENTS OF THE SECOND SECTION JUDGEMENT 
  
The first ECtHR judgement in the Lautsi v. Italy affair in November 2009 rules 
on an application submitted by Ms. Lautsi where, in her own behalf and on behalf of her 
children, she invokes the breach of two rights identified autonomously: her right as 
mother to educate her children in her own religious and moral beliefs (art.2 Protocol 
No.1) and her freedom of thought and religion (art.9 ECHR)18. According to the 
complainant arguments, no possible violation of children’s freedoms arises before the 
Court, since the complaint only refers to Ms. Lautsi’s own rights. The application 
suggests that the hypothetical infringement of children’s freedom of thought and 
religion because of the presence of a religious symbol in their classrooms is a subsidiary 
issue of the mother’s rights; however, the fundamental reason which sustains the 
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 Lautsi v. Italy, no. 30814/06, §27, ECHR 2009. 
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violation of the involved rights is, paradoxically, the particular vulnerability of the 
children before external interferences due to their youth19. 
 
Against the arguments of the applicant, the Italian Government focuses its 
arguments on the assumed non-religious connotations of the crucifix, presented as a 
neutral symbol whose presence in classrooms does not involve any kind of action or 
interaction from the students. According to Italian authorities, the crucifix is just a 
“passive symbol” with the same importance and entity than any other institutional or 
official icon because it represents secular values when regarded under the Italian 
constitutional tradition. 
 
The firsts striking feature of this first judgement is the absence of any reference 
to the doctrine of the margin of appreciation, which had an important weight in previous 
rulings on States’ competences on education and its limits, especially when there is a 
possible transmission of moral values20. This difference from the previous doctrine is 
the main argument of the most critical authors (Weiler 2010; Parejo 2010), who 
consider that ignoring this, the Court is imposing to the member States a particular type 
of relationship with the religious beliefs incompatible with the European constitutional 
diversity and the national particularities21. It is true that, until this judgement, the 
ECtHR had given a very wide margin of discretion to the States in matters related to 
religious freedom, but this doctrine, in practice, has not been very useful as protection 
mechanism (Solar 2011). One can question even if that margin of appreciation is not 
more than a formality designed to justify a completely arbitrary treatment on certain 
religious symbols (Ronchi 2011). 
 
The principle the Second Section takes from the previous rulings and applies in 
this one is the prohibition of indoctrination as the limit for state decisions and policies in 
education22. The Court’s previous doctrine clearly establishes the duty to refrain from 
imposing any religious value through the educative curricular contents. But this is not 
the only field of application for this principle. According to this judgement, the duty of 
neutrality imposes on the entire educative context as a whole, introducing expressly for 
the public educational environment some rules previously established on teachers23, and 
also on students24. In the Court’s arguments underlies the idea of a public school as an 
inclusive space where all pupils and parents can be respected in their convictions 
beyond hypothetical impositions from ideological majorities. In words of Mancini, 
                                                          
19
 Id. at §31. 
20
 Kjeldsen, Busk Madsen and Pedersen v. Denmark, no. 5095/71; 5920/72; 5926/72, 7 december 1976, 
§53, Series A no. 23; Valsamis v. Greece, no.  21787/93, §28, ECHR 1996-VI; Dahlab v. Switzerland 
(dec.), no. 42393/98, ECHR 2001-V; Folgerø and Others v. Norway [GC], no. 15472/02, §84(g), ECHR 
2007-III; Hasan  and Eylem Zengin v. Turkey, no. 1448/04, §51, ECHR 2007-XI. 
21
 In the opposite direction, Mancini (2010, p.24) considers the judgement has indeed taken into account 
the Italian domestic context, because “the case analyses the history of the mandatory display of the 
crucifix in state schools, in the context of the relationship between the Italian State and the church, and 
cites all the relevant Constitutional Court case-law”. 
22
 Hasan  and Eylem Zengin v. Turkey, no. 1448/04, §52, ECHR 2007-XI. 
23
 Dahlab v. Switzerland (dec.), no. 42393/98, ECHR 2001-V. 
24
 Dogru v. France, no. 27058/05, 4 march 2009. 
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(2010: p.25), this is an expression of the Court’s “counter-majoritarian role (…) to 
correct some of the major deficiencies of majoritarian democracy”, which is especially 
important in education, where religious minorities are, in fact, in a vulnerable position 
in regard to a majority that configures the system according its moral values and 
patterns. 
 
The Second Section begins its ruling proclaiming the right of art.2 of Protocol 
No.1 should be considered in relation to the right to private life and the freedom of 
thought and religion, as well as its applicability both in the public and the private 
school. Thereafter, the Court exposes the essential substantive argument of its 
reasoning: the duty for the state to create an “open school environment” where 
indoctrination is prohibited and where the different religious and philosophical options 
can have a place in order to allow that the pupils “can acquire knowledge about their 
respective thoughts and traditions” as the best way to ensure, in the first instance, the 
respect to the parents’ convictions25, or better said, those convictions the parents would 
transmit to their children within the framework of the educative pluralism that, 
according to the Court, is recognized in the art.2 of Protocol No.126. But when the 
judgement develops that duty of respect to personal convictions, as a manifestation of 
the negative freedom of thought and religion, it does it in reference to both the 
conscience of the parents and the conscience of the pupils individually and separately 
mentioned27. With this detail, the Court is considering the children’s convictions are 
also an object of protection and a final purpose of the state duty of neutrality. 
 
So, the Second Section, at least in its approach and in part of the argumentative 
development, seems to take distance from the previous Court doctrine that established 
the art.2 of the Protocol No.1 is a special rule in relation to the generic freedom of 
thought and religion of art.9 ECHR and, under which, all controversies related to both 
articles should be solved only applying the first one28. Nonetheless, the judgement 
conclusions show this distance is only apparent, but gives interesting details. 
 
This ruling has some explicit argumentative elements that are directly engaged 
with the art.9 ECHR, and show an approach to the matter that considers the freedom of 
thought and religion of the children as a relevant element, but less clear is if the Court 
really considers it as a separate right from parents’ equivalent. In many occasions, the 
ruling shows how the children’s freedom of conscience is confused with the parents’ 
one and, even, is regarded completely dependent on the parental right of educative 
guidance. It seems that, for the Second Section, children’s freedom of belief is not an 
autonomous right, but a simple projection of the parent’s legal capacities. 
 
                                                          
25
 Lautsi v. Italy, no. 30814/06, §47(c) and (d), ECHR 2009. 
26
 Folgerø and Others v. Norway [GC], no. 15472/02, §84(b), ECHR 2007-III; Hasan  and Eylem Zengin 
v. Turkey, no. 1448/04, §47-55, ECHR 2007-XI; more explicit, Appel-Irrgang and Others v. Germany 
(dec.), no. 45216/07, ECHR 2009. 
27
 Lautsi v. Italy, no. 30814/06, §47(e), ECHR 2009. 
28
 Specially, Folgerø and Others v. Norway [GC], no. 15472/02, §84, ECHR 2007-III. 
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The freedom of thought and religion of the pupils appears in the ruling 
arguments when they refer to the particular vulnerability of their conscience. For 
example, the Court estates as limit for the presence of the religious symbols its possible 
impact on the parental rights, but after it they have said that “the nature of the religious 
symbols and its impact on young pupils” should be considered29. It is also claimed that 
the religious symbols in the classrooms “may be emotionally disturbing for pupils of 
other religions or those who profess no religion” in a direct manner30, so it should be 
prohibited in order to protect the negative dimension of the freedom of thought and 
religion, directly attributed, apparently, to the pupils. Finally, the main conclusion of the 
judgement is that the presence of religious symbols in the neutral educational 
environment can influence in the formation of children’s conscience, and that “restricts 
the right of parents to educate their children in conformity with their convictions” (art.2 
of Protocol No.1), but also “the right of schoolchildren to believe or not believe”31. This 
last statement should logically conclude in a breach of the art.9 ECHR regarding the 
children in addition to the infringement of art.2 of Protocol No.1, but it does not. 
 
Other premises also show a partial attention to the freedom of thought and 
religion of children as a different right at issue, and are those which reveal the presence 
of their best interest in the judgement. The first one is the importance given to the 
education in plurality, which is, after all, an instrument oriented to the correct 
development of the underage pupils’ personality; inasmuch it is a basic component of 
the education in freedom, the plurality benefits the children’s individual interest and 
supports the free formation of their ethics system against harmful interferences in a 
particularly vulnerable moment. In this way, the Court prevents against the risks that a 
possible religious preference manifested by the state can suppose on children, who do 
not have full critical capacity32. It is impossible to know if, saying this, the members of 
the Second Section of the ECtHR were thinking about the need to safeguard the free 
formation of the children’s conscience as an expression of their best interest, but their 
reasoning clearly fits in this approach. 
 
Less evident is the position given to the underage pupils in the global context of 
the matter when the specific behavior of the State is analyzed and the ECtHR concludes 
it is incompatible with the ECHR. At this point, the Court mixes and confuses the 
children’s freedom with the parents’ right to educate them. It is not possible to say that 
the legal position of the children and their best interest are clearly the core elements in 
the case because the limit imposed to the “indoctrination” in the public education is the 
duty to respect the parents’ religious and philosophical beliefs. But it is obvious that 
these adults will not be exposed to the symbol as pupils will do; the measure of put a 
crucifix in a classroom will impact primarily on the children. If there is a transmission 
of religious values, it happens between the state and the pupils, and this circumstance is 
not desirable because may involve a decisive pressure on young minds without critical 
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 Lautsi v. Italy, no. 30814/06, §48(d) and 50, ECHR 2009. 
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 Id. at §55. 
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 Id. at §57. 
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capacity enough. It is true that the pupils’ beliefs have been previously oriented by the 
moral principles transmitted by their parents, but the impact on adults’ rights is just 
indirect. 
 
In these terms, the Court is recognizing that, with the presence of the crucifix, 
the children are being the passive subjects of an inadmissible proselytizing action by the 
state, regardless of the concrete right violated by this, because it is performed on 
vulnerable minds. However, due to the negative charge of the word, the Court does not 
employ the term “proselytism” in the ruling. It speaks about the interdiction of 
“activities of preaching” at school33, whose objective cannot be other than the 
proselytism. It also gives the idea of the enormous power as a transmitter of beliefs that 
a religious symbol placed in a classroom has in opinion of the Court. 
 
In order to properly asses this question, it is necessary to deal with the debate 
about the “passive” or “active” force of religious symbols, which is one of the main 
argumentative lines of the Great Chamber ruling; thus, it will be analyzed in the 
following chapter. Even so, in this moment it should be noted that this first judgement 
on the Lautsi affair widely coincides with the decision, also from the Second Section of 
the Court, in the case Dahlab v. Switzerland of 2009, expressly cited as an 
argumentative referent34. In this decision, the Court ruled inadmissible the application 
of a teacher who was forced not to wear the Islamic headscarf in class by the Swiss 
education authorities. Even though there were no complaints from pupil’s parents, the 
measure was considered rightful on account of “the potential interference with the 
religious beliefs of her pupils, other pupils at the school and the pupils’ parents, and by 
the breach of the principle of denominational neutrality in schools” because school 
teachers are “both participants in the exercise of educational authority and 
representatives of the State” and, so, responsible for “the protection of the legitimate 
aim of ensuring the neutrality of the State education system against the freedom to 
manifest one’s religion”35. As public figures inside the educational environment, 
neutrality is a compulsory duty for the teachers, not only a rule for the public spaces 
organization. 
 
In the Dahlab decision, the doctrine of the margin of appreciation was not an 
impediment to assess the merits of the case. According to the Court, the headscarf, as a 
religious symbol, has a strong symbolic power, so, when displayed by a teacher, it could 
have a proselytizing effect on the pupils, with an impact which is hardly to measure 
because of the vulnerability of children due to their age. In these terms, the restriction of 
the teacher’s freedom of religion is an adequate measure to protect State neutrality and 
the children’s conscience because “appears difficult to reconcile the wearing of an 
Islamic headscarf with the message of tolerance, respect for others and, above all, 
equality and non-discrimination that all teachers in a democratic society must convey to 
their pupils”36. 
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This reasoning also underlies in the Second Section judgement on the Lautsi 
affair. It is a very protectionist point of view to prevent any hypothetical undesired 
alteration in the pupil’s conscience, and its consequence is that any religious symbol 
should be forbidden in the classrooms even if there is not a reported violation of the 
freedom of religion. In Dahlab, the Court gives a critical importance to the neutrality in 
the public educational system because of its instrumental role in the free development of 
children’s conscience, and it legitimates any preventive limitative measure on 
fundamental rights. The final resolution of the Lautsi ruling seems to be obvious when 
considering this doctrine, even more because this case has two particularities which 
reinforce the sense of this line of argument. The first one is a difference in the concrete 
religious symbol exposed before the pupils. For a child, who do not really know what 
Islam is nor the meaning of its symbols, the headscarf can be interpreted as a simply 
garment without any religious value. However, the crucifix in a wall does not have any 
other possible sense than a religious symbol, as the Great Chamber itself recognizes in 
its further judgement37. If there are strong reasons to forbid in the public space a symbol 
that can easily have other interpretations that the religious one, at least for the pupils 
who will see it, there should be more to prohibit one whose sense is unambiguously 
religious.  
 
The second difference between the case facts is the “place” where the symbol is 
exposed, and the different legal position of each one. In Dahlab, the restriction is 
imposed on a person, a subject of the freedom of religion; consequently, it constitutes a 
limitation on the exercise of a fundamental right. According to art.9.2 ECHR, this 
measure will only be lawful if it constitutes a necessary and proportional measure in a 
democratic society for the protection of pluralism, tolerance and the minorities38, in 
addition to meeting the criteria of the mentioned article, including the protection of the 
rights and freedoms of others. When the Court legitimates the prohibition of wearing a 
headscarf because it is “necessary”, it is placing the objective of this measure beyond an 
individual fundamental right (in order to protect other rights), reinforcing its serious 
purpose. Unlike individuals, as Gibson (2010, p.212) says, “classrooms do not have 
human rights”. On the contrary, a classroom is a material element property of the State 
where neutrality and impartiality should be represented in benefit of all. When 
displaying a religious symbol in a public building, there is not any relevant element 
which can override the pupil’s (and parent’s also) rights in a weighting of interests. 
There are no “fundamental rights of the state” in front of them. Thus, the prohibition of 
the religious symbol is even more justified than in the case of the teacher. 
 
In any case, once it is concluded that the religious symbol placed in the public 
space has a real capacity of influence, an unquestionable proposition for Second Section 
of the ECHR, the question is to know on what element worthy of protection does it. The 
people directly exposed to the symbol are the pupils, as they are the attendants in the 
classroom where the crucifix is and who can be indoctrinated due to their immaturity 
and the educational context where the influence is received. But, is the measure of 
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avoiding the religious symbol really oriented to protect their particular, individual and 
separate interests? If the pupils are old enough to have their own private beliefs and the 
state tries to convert them to another faith, there is clearly a direct violation of their 
freedom of thought and religion but, what happens when they are not mature enough? 
 
It is true that, when the religious values introduced in the classroom do not 
correspond with the parents’ ones, it is possible to see an infringement of art.2 of 
Protocol No.1, because the public authorities are educating children in ethics values that 
are different from parents’ desires when they are not authorized to do that. The Court 
clearly agrees with this conclusion. But when the children are clearly immature and the 
values adopted by the public authorities are private ones which represent a concrete 
ethical point of view that does not correspond to the objectivity and plurality the 
education needs in order to train free citizens, there should be considered also a 
violation of their freedom of thought and religion, in addition to the parental right, as a 
consequence of a public policy contrary to their best interest.  
 
For this reason, the art.9 ECHR should not only be as a complementary 
guideline of art.2 of Protocol No.1. It is also a directly applicable rule whose possible 
violation should also be explicitly taken into account as a possible limit to the 
indoctrination in public education, but the Court did not categorically establish this. 
Educative pluralism has a double objective: it serves the parents’ right to ensure their 
children will share their beliefs, but it should be also considered as an instrument to 
develop the children’s best interest itself. A pluralistic education, in a broad sense, 
allows pupils to know multiple options, different from the ethical values of their 
parents, in an objective manner, giving them a real option to choose with a high degree 
of freedom according to their evolution.  
 
But the Court, at the end of the ruling, concludes that the presence of a crucifix 
in a classroom only violates the art.2 of Protocol No.1, along with the freedom of 
thought and religion in the abstract. So, is it possible to conclude this judgement directly 
protects the rights of the children as a way to ensure their best interest? Or the pupils’ 
freedom of thought and religion is only taken into account as a projection of the parents’ 
ones, which are exercised through the right to choose the religious and moral education 
of their children? The answer appears to be closer to the second option. In the previous 
rulings, particularly in the Dahlab case, the Court seems to have a special sensibility 
towards the specific interests of children that, in this judgement, finally dilutes in the 
right of parents to ensure such education and teaching in conformity with their own 
religious and philosophical convictions.  
 
The idea of the children’s best interest is implicit in the educative system’s 
defining criteria employed by the Court; it takes into account some separate elements 
that define and reach that interest, but the concept itself does not appear in the ruling. 
For this reason, despite it is not ignored, the children’s best interest has not the desirable 
entity in the arguments employed. In fact, the Court does not solve if the children are 
subjects of the freedom of thought and religion, and also fails to define the contents of 
this right when applied to pupils, or its relationship with the parental educational 
The Position of Children’s Freedom of Thought and Religion 
in the Rulings of the European Court of Human Rights on the Case Lautsi v. Italy 
 
The Age of Human Rights Journal, 1 (2013) 
81 
 
capacities. It seems that, for the Second Section, the freedom of thought and religion of 
children is not an autonomous right, but not because of its relative dependence from 
parent’s beliefs. When the convictions of children are referred, they seem to be 
identified as the same as the parents ones, without any consideration of their 
autonomous character, even though indoctrination is prohibited because of its effects on 
the conscience “of the pupils”, not the parents. 
 
This is a questionable perspective, because it concludes that children’s 
convictions will be respectable and protected against proselytism only if they are the 
same than the parents’ beliefs, which are the object of the only right considered as 
vulnerable, the art.2 of Protocol No.1. If pupils have a different faith than their parents it 
seems that a hypothetical public proselytism could be accepted inasmuch as those 
convictions have no fundamental protection. Forgetting the interest of the children and 
the obvious circumstance that they are different people from their parents, the Court 
shows a short perspective of the problem and, wrongly, focuses the benefits or the 
pluralist education only in the adults. In this sense, the judgment of the Second Section 
is very unambitious, losing a good opportunity to begin building a statute of the children 
as a subject of rights within the Council of Europe, and discarding arguments that would 
have been more difficult to refute for the Great Chamber. 
 
IV. THE GREAT CHAMBER JUDGEMENT 
 
IV.1. Starting premises 
 
On March 2011, the Great Chamber of the ECtHR ruled again on the Lautsi 
affair because of the appeal of the Italian Government against the Second Section 
judgement. In the new procedure, decided by majority of 15 votes against 2, the Court 
revokes the initial ruling to conclude that the presence of a crucifix in the classrooms of 
Italian public schools does not violate the right of the parents to ensure the education of 
their children according to their own convictions in the terms of the art.2 of Protocol 
No.1. The Court also considers there are no questions that should be specifically 
analyzed under the art.9 ECHR, restricting the problem to the parental right as a special 
rule in relation to the freedom of thought and religion (of the adults)39. The Great 
Chamber even asserts there is no violation of the children’s parental right of educative 
guidance40, as if the pupils could be the active subjects of this right. This can give the 
idea of how confused are the judges about the real dimension and meaning of the 
involved rights. 
 
The consideration of art.2 of Protocol No.1 as lex especialis was yet present in 
the foundations of the initial ruling on this case, but now this principle is applied more 
strictly. In the arguments of the second Lautsi judgement, the hypothetical incidence of 
the religious symbol on the children’s negative freedom of religion has no place. The 
conduct of the Italian State is always put in relation with the right to choose the moral 
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and religion values of the education of the children, and only the possible breach of this 
right in the educational environment is assessed41. This is the first mistake of the ruling, 
consequence of an inadequate doctrine of the ECtHR. Only the position and the rights 
of the parents are conceived, so the child’s freedom of thought and religion turns 
completely empty and his subjective capacity annulled.  
 
Under this circumstance, it is very difficult to study the possible consequences of 
the arguments of the Court in the configuration of children’s freedom of thought and 
religion, because this right is just simply not part of the ratio decidendi of the ruling. 
For the Court, the only right with entity enough to be considered is the parents’ right to 
ensure such education and teaching of their children in conformity with their own 
religions and philosophical convictions, not even their freedom of conscience. The sum 
of the delimitation of legal positions and the argumentative development leads to a 
doctrine which converts the pupils in the weak object of the absolute right of their 
parents to define their convictions and, therefore, results incomplete. 
 
Despite its omission, the particular freedom of thought and religion of the pupils 
and the need to safeguard their best interest, which is the main objective of the 
educative system, should be taken as assessment criteria of the Court's arguments. They 
are the elements that allow finding out whether the doctrine developed is useful to 
protect them, directly or indirectly through the right of educational guide. 
 
Aside from this, the Great Chamber judgement repeats two premises of the 
previous one, although its concrete application to the case is surprisingly different. First, 
it declares that State has the duty to adopt a neutral and impartial position in relation to 
the exercise of religious pluralism, where the right to not believe in any religion is also 
included42. Consequently, the Court considers that indoctrination and proselytism 
through education is forbidden, but only when it “might be considered as not respecting 
parents’ religious and philosophical convictions”, no matter the possible consequences 
on children’s best interest. The right of the parents, and only this one, is the limit to the, 
on the other hand, wide margin of appreciation the States enjoy to configure the 
educative sphere, which includes “all the functions” assumed in this field and not only 
the setting and planning of the curriculum43.  
 
On a separate issue, the Great Chamber expressly recognizes the essentially 
religious nature of the crucifix beyond any other possible lecture of its meaning44. 
However, the reasons given in developing this principle are not well justified. The 
consideration of the crucifix as a religious symbol contrasts with the absence of 
indoctrination capacity that the Court attributes to it, turning over the reasons given by 
the Second Section without a real explanation. Then, the Great Chamber appeals to the 
lack of a European consensus in the regulation of the interaction between public sphere 
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and religion to justify an extension of the doctrine of the margin of appreciation beyond 
the limits previously imposed. 
 
IV.2. The appraisal about the intrinsic force of religious symbols 
 
For the Great Chamber, “there is no evidence before the Court that the display of 
a religious symbol on classroom walls may have an influence on pupils and so it cannot 
reasonably be asserted that it does or does not have an effect on young persons whose 
convictions are still in the process of being formed”45, so there is no breach of the right 
recognized in the art.2 of Protocol No.1. Even though pupils’ convictions are shortly 
mentioned, their subordination to the parental guide right reinforces the idea, which 
underlies also in the first judgement, that the children’s ideas and beliefs are only 
relevant when they are the same as the ideas of their parents, with no autonomous 
entity.  
 
The Great Chamber justifies the crucifix has not any indoctrinatory effect on 
pupils because it is a “passive symbol” 46, despite its obvious religious sense that clearly 
affects the state neutrality and impartiality47. This statement is particularly confusing 
because nobody explains what it means or where is the difference with an “active” 
symbol. In fact, the position of a symbol presiding a classroom and the educational 
activities converts it in an icon with a clear and significant presence, making it “active” 
(Llamazares Calzadilla 2005) no matter its concrete religious or secular character. 
However, the Court simply asserts the harmlessness of the crucifix for the conscience of 
underage pupils and, additionally, its inability to counteract the parents influence on 
them because there are no evidences that it can do it. But, heretofore, the presumption 
was completely the opposite: except proof to the contrary, the mere presence of a 
religious symbol in a classroom was an indoctrination act. This is exactly the reason the 
Court employs in Dahlab to justify that the prohibition of wearing a headscarf imposed 
to a teacher does not breach the ECHR (Arlettaz 2012). 
 
The main doctrine has changed from considering every religious symbol has a 
proselytizing effect to think that one in specific has not without giving any reason. This 
constitutes an unjustified change of criteria before two equal cases.  
 
It is very difficult to find a satisfactory explanation of this circumstance. The 
different age of children in each case does not seem relevant (Ronchi 2011), because in 
Dahlab the pupils were between the ages of 4 and 8, and in Lautsi, between 8 and 12, a 
very close interval and a very similar possibility to be influenced at school. Neither is 
logical to consider (Zucca 2013) that a symbol on a wall is not strong because is not 
being referred by teachers, nor that only worn symbols can indoctrinate, because it 
ignores the direct impact consubstantial to every visual representation. Precisely 
because of this effect, it is impossible to conclude that indoctrination can only be 
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materialized by the words, taking part in religious activities or through the non-
objective confessional instruction, as expressly the Great Chamber says 48. 
 
Finally, giving a symbol a passive character because the values it represents are 
conceived as more respectable or are not unfriendly with the beliefs shared by the 
majority is, simply, a discriminatory argument incompatible with neutrality and 
pluralism.  Nonetheless, the Court shows a tendency to overprotect the predominant 
religious confessions beyond neutrality (Solar 2011) and, until the first Lautsi ruling, 
“Christian values have been defended even at the expense of trampling on fundamental 
individual freedoms, because the ECtHR did not perceive them as conflicting with the 
core values of the Convention system” (Mancini 2010: p.23), so it cannot be ruled out 
this idea, as well as a possible purpose to correct the discordant Second Section 
judgement in the Lautsi affair. 
 
The position adopted by the Great Chamber imposes “an incomparably weaker 
requirement to justify a limitation of the freedom of religion of the teacher than to 
justify the limitation of the state power”, which is not subject of rights (Solar 2011: 
p.583). In fact, under these arguments, the State has a greater capacity to express a 
religious adhesion than a citizen when, paradoxically, it has a duty of neutrality that 
must be strictly observed in order to guarantee the correct configuration of the 
educational environment and the respect of the related rights49. The resulting doctrine 
says that the exhibition of a religious symbol by a person who plays a public 
educational role must be forbidden due to its proselytizing effects; however, when is a 
public institution itself who shows the symbol in its facilities, those effects are not 
conceived as possible, perhaps because of the false idea that a subject can have the 
intention to indoctrinate others while the State (or, better said, the people who manage 
the State) cannot. 
 
Likewise, the Court is establishing a modulation in the scope of art.9 ECHR 
according to the contents of the subjects’ convictions or beliefs. Thus, under the topic 
“religious symbols in the public educational environment”, it is possible to find the 
following legitimated solutions: when a personal religious demonstration of a public 
servitor in the public space can have an impact on different religious convictions of 
other people, the first should be limited in order to protect these last (conclusions in the 
case Dahlab). When a State adopts the principle of strict neutrality, private religious 
demonstrations can be limited in the public space as a mechanism to ensure that 
principle (case Sahin). However, when the public authorities directly make a religious 
demonstration of a majoritarian faith and it collides with an individual belief which 
rejects every religious conviction, the result is that the limit should be imposed on the 
individual right to not believe (case Lautsi), without taking into account the supposed 
neutrality or other disturbed values, as the children’s best interest. It is very difficult to 
make this conclusion compatible with a real and effective recognition of the freedom of 
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thought and religion, which protects both the right to believe in a religion and the right 
to not believe in an equal manner. 
 
But apart from its discriminatory consequences, the undefined distinction 
between active and passive religious symbols introduced by the Court is also inadequate 
because of the absolute terms it is presented. The reality of the situation is basically 
subjective; everything depends on the perception of the different subjects involved and 
the particular capacities of each one. If a religious symbol is active because can make a 
subject doubt about his convictions and thinking about replace them by those which the 
symbol represents, the critical capacity and the maturity of the subject plays an 
important role. There will be people more suggestible than other, so the power of the 
symbol will not be the same for everyone. For an adult, whose convictions are normally 
strong, the simply perception of a symbol from a different system of faiths rarely will 
have an indoctrinatory effect, so the symbol will always have a passive effect, no matter 
its location or size, notwithstanding the possible breach of his negative freedom of 
thought and religion or the principle of neutrality. On the opposite side, when the 
exposed to the symbol are underage children, as it is in the case, the proselytizing effect 
of the symbol should be assessed in accordance with their particular subjective 
circumstances, so the possibility of finding active symbols is higher. All of that 
considering that the mere presence of a religious symbol in the public space will 
probably not be compatible with the main principle of secularism. 
 
The Court rejects this subjective approach to the matter and tries to put the 
capacity of influence of religious symbols in objective terms. According to the ruling, 
the subjective perception of the applicant “is not in itself sufficient” to establish a 
breach of Art.2 of Protocol No.150; the problem is the Great Chamber shares this 
conclusion after stating the connection of this right with the freedom of thought and 
religion, the most subjective of the fundamental rights which protects a reality the 
individual defines autonomously, and whose possible violations depend only on the 
perception of the subject (Zuccca 2013). Probably, the Court focuses the problem on the 
art.2 of Protocol No.1 in order to avoid considering a direct breach of the freedom of 
thought and religion of parents or children, situation which would have required a 
different final conclusion, as well as more coherent arguments. But even understanding 
that the only applicant’s right that can be violated in this situation is the right to choose 
the children’s religious and moral education, it does not prejudge nor determines the 
consequences of the presence of the crucifix on the pupils’ special subjective 
perception, circumstance which, itself, could constitute a problem under the perspective 
of art.9 ECHR. 
 
For an underage child, whose moral system is more permeable due to his 
immaturity, a concrete religious symbol, with no importance for an adult, can exercise 
pressure, making him thinking his convictions are not right because the meaning of that 
icon is no included in. This pressure will depend on the age and many other 
circumstances related to the intellectual development of each particular case, so it is 
                                                          
50Lautsi v. Italy [GC], no. 30814/06, §66, ECHR 2011. 
Daniel Capodiferro Cubero 
The Age of Human Rights Journal, 1 (2013) 
86 
 
almost impossible to find an objective assessment rule. When the Great Chamber 
invokes the lack of power of the symbol in order to justify its presence in classrooms is 
formalizing an unrealistic standard; it misunderstands the subjective position of children 
and, as a consequence, tries to assess the power on indoctrination of the religious 
symbol from a perspective of full maturity which is not the situation of the target group 
of the possible proselytizing message. 
 
If the Great Chamber had not only adopted the perspective of the parents sieved 
through this particular concept of the human beliefs, its final conclusion in the ruling 
would have been the same than the Second Section. 
 
Taking a realistic view, the pupils, as particularly vulnerable subjects integrated 
inside a concrete environment that is designed to educate them, need specific and 
particularly protective measures oriented to avoid any unlawful interference on their 
best interest and their freedom to develop their personality. The result of these measures 
should be a neutral and pluralistic environment where no particular beliefs have more 
visibility than others. The Court itself recognizes that the crucifix represents 
unambiguously a particular system of thought, and when is placed in a prominent place, 
the faith it represents is occupying the main part of the educational space. Additionally, 
it is difficult to conceive it as a neutral, cultural or innocuous symbol; therefore, it 
cannot be present in a neutral space as a representation of the State. 
 
IV.3.The inadequate application of the margin of appreciation doctrine 
 
The interpretation of the doctrine of the margin of appreciation that the Great 
Chamber sustains in the Lautsi ruling is almost a consequence of the previous 
proposition. If the presence of a crucifix in a classroom placed by the public authorities 
has no entity enough to breach any fundamental right, due to his “passive” condition, 
the concrete regulation of this question is not important from the perspective of the 
ECHR. Consequently, there is no problem for the States to regulate it however they 
want because its only hypothetical limit, the prohibition of indoctrination, is not 
applicable. 
 
The Court justifies the employment of the margin of appreciation doctrine by a 
lack of European consensus on this particular issue51. This is a very recurrent statement 
when the ECtHR faces possible violations of the freedom of thought and religion, which 
are always analyzed from a conservative point of view (Mancini 2010). But in the 
particular case of religious interferences on the educational environment, the Court’s 
assertion does not correspond exactly to the reality.  
 
It is true there is no European consensus on the specific regulations about the 
presence of religious symbols at schools if considering the different education 
legislations in detail. There is no consensus either on the different models of 
relationship between the States and the religious faiths, but this is a question that should 
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have not been introduced within the merits of the case because it is a political question 
at the end, not a human right’s problem. However, it is possible to identify a European 
common standard: the respect to the negative religious freedom of the individuals 
(Barrero 2012), no matter the concrete position of the State with regard to the religion; 
this principle is a positive obligation to public authorities that would modulate the 
margin of appreciation52. The protection of the children’s freedom of religion can be 
identified as a part of this duty because it is a purpose that, in the abstract, no 
democratic State will reject either as a target itself or as a projection of the parents’ 
freedoms. Likewise, the prohibition of discrimination (the purpose of educational 
neutrality) is also a common accepted principle. If the Court had taken into account 
these factors, the breadth given to the margin of appreciation of the States in the 
question should have been drastically reduced. But in this case, the Great Chamber 
shows great respect for the States and little for the perspective of the parents (Zucca 
2013), apart from no consideration for children.  
 
Although there is no consensus on the specific regulatory terms of the private 
convictions in the public space, it is possible to find it regarding the objectives which 
must be respected. And this is a case about a breach of a fundamental objective: the 
compulsory respect to fundamental rights regardless the specific profits a State decides 
to give to a concrete religious faith. For this, it is false that the Court cannot assess the 
merits of the case. It can do it and it must do it because the question is directly related to 
the ECHR. 
 
The solution adopted by the Great Chamber leaves the children’s freedom of 
thought and religion unprotected against unlawful interferences. It renounces to impose 
any kind of control on hypothetical ideological pressures exerted on pupils belonging to 
minority groups, who are also unarmed against the influence of the majority due to their 
immaturity. In its previous doctrine, the Court asserted that “in countries where the 
great majority of the population owe allegiance to one particular religion, manifestation 
of the observances and symbols of that religion, without restriction as to place and 
manner, may constitute pressure on students who do not practice that religion or those 
who adhere to another religion”53, and the principle of secularism forbids it54. This is 
the conclusion when the analyzed environment is the university, where students are 
mature, so it is reasonable to believe that if the pupils are 8 or 12 years old the potential 
pressure could be higher and restrictive measures on expression of private beliefs are 
more justified; in fact, these measures are even necessary in order to ensure educational 
pluralism. 
 
The doctrine of the margin of appreciation worked well as mechanism to protect 
the convictions and the freedom of thought and religion only of the majority (Mancini 
2010), and the second Lautsi ruling reinforces this role. Its conclusions give the States 
full power to incorporate into the public space (the classroom) symbolic elements that 
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 As expressed in the Dissenting Opinion of judges Malinverni and Kalaydjeva to the Lautsi Great 
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most pupils recognizes but some of them do not, protecting the best interest of the 
majority but not the minority’s one. The Court is legitimating the employment of 
mechanisms oriented to the cultural homogenization of the society through the 
education, which is clearly a perversion of its principal purpose at the service of 
children’s best interest. 
 
The main practical consequences of the wide capacity given to the States is that 
only those parents and pupils belonging to the dominant ideology or faith will enjoy the 
freedom of thought and religion, in contrast to the unjustified restriction imposed to 
everybody else. According to the logic employed by the Court, the right of being 
respected by the State in the religious field recognized in art.9 ECHR will only operate 
if there is a majority agreement saying the concrete impugned practice breaches this 
right (Ronchi 2011). On the other hand, if the breach of the freedom of conscience is 
obvious but the majority accepts it because only a minority is affected, it will never be 
considered a violation of art.9 ECHR. It is obvious the majority will never consider 
their practices or symbols as a distortion of a right, regardless who can be affected 
because the solidarity is not always present. Fundamental rights are universal protective 
instruments which play a special role against majority abuses; therefore, a doctrine like 
this has no sense because, in practice, it implies the inefficacy of the Convention.   
 
In order to facilitate the free development of the pupils in their own ideas taking 
into account the parents’ ones, the public educational system must show a strict 
neutrality. This means the State cannot be the messenger of ethical values or symbols 
that are not unanimously accepted, because it converts the public (common) space in the 
private space of the majority, which will not be perceived as theirs by the minorities. 
Without symbolic neutrality, those children who do not identify their beliefs with the 
religious icons the State supports in the name of the majority will feel they are different; 
consequently, they might be tempted to adopt the majority convictions in order to be 
accepted by the group. In fact, it is possible to understand that, when the public 
authorities put a religious symbol dominating a classroom, they are sending to the 
pupils the message that they should accept the beliefs it represents if they want to be 
like the others. With this attitude, the State is offering children a “social advantage”, 
their full social integration, if they abandon their atheists, agnostic or different religious 
faith and accept the majority convictions. This is exactly what the ECtHR defined time 
ago as “improper proselytism”55, which can rightfully be limited by States without 
violating the art.9 ECHR. Against this great capacity given to the States to condition the 
children’s moral values, the parent’s capacity of instilling different values might be 
overcome. 
 
As aggravating factor of this case, the proselytizing conduct is not implemented 
by a person, who could develop it as a part of his religious freedom, but by the Italian 
State, which should respect neutrality because its Constitution embodies the 
fundamental principle of secularism. On the contrary, the arguments of the Italian 
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Government’s appeal before the Great Chamber proclaim some kind of “sociological 
confesionalism” as a duty to give a preferential treatment and visibility to me majority 
religion in the public spaces despite it is not the official faith of the State; after this, the 
Government does not hesitate to put it ahead to the validity of the fundamental rights 
using as an excuse the concept of “national particularity”56. The Italian authorities are 
disregarding the principle of secularism and causing a constitutional mutation which 
modifies the content of the principle of secularism into a duty of submission to a 
concrete religion. 
 
Under these circumstances, the public sphere is no more the place of all citizens 
to become only the place of the majority, who merely tolerates the existence of other 
ethics options and considers the public spaces are the natural place to promote a 
concrete ideology beyond the fundamental rights. According to the conclusions of the 
Great Chamber, the majority can also place the dominant faith promotion before the 
specific needs of a vulnerable group, the underage children, whose best interest has no 
consideration if it does not match the dominant religion’s ideas. Against these 
dangerous consequences, the answer given by the ECtHR is the acceptance of the Italian 
Government’s arguments, no matter the consequences57. With the assumption of the 
idea that majority convictions and symbols, which are not unanimous, can have a 
preferential place in the public space, the Great Chamber revokes a judgement that was 
“an important step forward in taking minority rights seriously, even when this requires a 
rethinking of traditional domestic equilibria” based on the European religious 
homogeneity (Mancini 2010: p. 26). The result is a timorous doctrine that results 
completely useless as mechanism of protection of children’s fundamental rights.  
 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
 
The Great Chamber judgement revoking the first instance Court decision in the 
Lautsi affair is a step backward in the ECtHR doctrine. The excessive scope it gives to 
the national margin of appreciation and the better consideration of a concrete belief 
system against others it develops in its arguments are very questionable arguments, but, 
above these reasons and in a veiled form, the judgement declares the renouncement of 
the Court to protect the freedom of thought and religion of children in a concrete 
manner. Indeed, the Great Chamber opts in favor of other principles before their best 
interest, ruling on a question about underage children without speaking about children’s 
interests and rights. 
 
Neither of the two Court rulings in this case incorporates specifically in their 
premises or values the principle of children’s best interest, but the first ruling shows a 
partial and instrumental approach to it. In its arguments, the Second Section analyses 
the possible direct infringement of the pupils’ freedom of thought and religion, and this 
is linked with the need of a neutral and impartial educative environment, which is one 
of the essential instruments for achieving children’s free personal development and, 
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consequentially, to benefit their best interest as a result of the education in real freedom. 
But in the conclusion of the judgment, the Second Section only considers a violation of 
the art.2 of Protocol No.1 (the right of parents to ensure such education and teaching in 
conformity with their own religious and philosophical convictions), so it is not possible 
to say children’s rights are a real focus of attention for the Court themselves. The final 
result of the argumentative development spoils the content of the ideas exposed by 
reducing the final conclusion to a problem of parent’s rights strictly. The Court is 
suggesting the pupil’s freedom of conscience is only a direct projection of parent’s one 
with no individual entity, which is to say that children’s right should not be protected by 
themselves, but only as an object of parental authority.  
 
This conclusion is much more visible in the Great Chamber judgement, whose 
arguments contain almost no references to children’s legal position in the case. In fact, 
the Second Section shows a particular perspective in its rulings about religions symbols 
(cases Dahlab and Lautsi) that the Great Chamber does not share now, but apparently 
previously did (case Sahin). 
 
If the first ruling is not perfect, it contains, at least, a transversal consideration of 
the subjective position of children and appoints mechanisms that, de facto, impact 
positively in the protection and the promotion of their best interest in application of an, 
apparently consolidated, doctrine about the neutrality of public educative spaces. The 
final Lautsi judgement, on the other hand, seems to be more oriented to give a 
politically correct solution and to not spite Catholic stakeholders than to address the real 
doubt: if a religious symbol has any kind of proselytizing effect on young children and 
if this is acceptable regarding the compulsory protection of their best interest. 
 
The second ruling reveals an incomplete and reductionist approximation to the 
problematic question, thinking the problem is limited to the impact of a potential 
“official” indoctrination of pupils on parent’s right to choose their moral and religious 
education in a secularist system. This approach ignores the most vulnerable element, the 
child, who is the primary target of educative public policies and decisions. And this is, 
at the end, a controversy about the freedom of thought and religion framed by the 
particular characteristics, needs and subjects of the educational context. 
 
When reading the Great Chamber judgement, it is obvious the pupils’ 
subjectivity does not deserve the attention of the Court. It does not hesitate to change 
radically the opinion about a measure which directly concerns children without 
justifying or explaining how the new position adopted benefits or encourages their best 
interest or rights. The Court is strictly applying a previous doctrine that says the art.2 of 
Protocol No.1 is lex specialis in relation to art.9 of the ECHR, and this circumstance is 
true, but only under the perspective of the parents regarding the State obligation to 
respect the parental guide right. This doctrine should not be considered as a correct 
approach to the problem of the presence of religious symbols in the public educative 
space because it forgets the implications on the freedom of thought and religion of 
children itself, which is a different right than parents one.  
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The freedom to choose the religious and moral education of the own children has 
two main readings. As a right to shape the children’s conscience according to the own 
convictions, determining its contents without any margin of freedom for the child, or as 
an instrumental right, consequence of the freedom of conscience, but basically 
recognized to serve to the correct and free formation of children’s conscience. The most 
rights-based interpretation is the second one, because the limitations on the children’s 
rights are only consequence of their lack of adulthood, and any measure oriented to 
substitute their autonomy may be only justified as a way to reach it in the future. When 
the Court subsumes the pupils’ freedom of conscience under the art.2 of Protocol No.1 
is, in essence, recognizing their parents a full capacity to determine from outside which 
are the children’s interests, because they do not have any right to be educated in 
freedom (or, at least, the Court does not consider it). 
 
The Great Chamber incomprehension of the meaning and objectives of the 
fundamental rights systems when applied to the children also influences in the 
conclusion, especially when it says that it is a question that falls into the margin of 
appreciation of the States. Under this point of view, the Court is converting a matter of 
rights in an issue about the systems of relationship between the States and the religious 
faith, creating an artificial problem and, later, trying to elude it. But the most important, 
it is renouncing to protect a concrete right, the freedom of thought and religion, 
allowing the public authorities to adopt any measure they consider appropriate 
according to their own circumstances or the balance of internal powers. This 
circumstance has two critical consequences on the configuration of the protection of 
freedom of thought and religion, especially for the children. The first one is that, 
according to the Great Chamber doctrine, a State can decide everything it wants about 
the presence of private ethics symbols in the public space, no matter if it disturbs 
anyone’s conscience or the possible breach of the duty to protect the children’s best 
interest through a neutral educational system oriented to create free citizens.  
 
The second consequence is that, under these principles, the majority symbols are 
legitimated to be imposed, overriding any strange, different or minority belief. In 
addition, the Court accepts a State can freely act as an instrument of this purpose instead 
of respecting the plurality, employing the educational system as a mechanism to 
publicize religious icons that might orientate the young generations to these convictions. 
Adults can, more or less, defend themselves against this interference, but the more 
suggestible children probably cannot. When education becomes an indoctrination 
system, circumstance that is not a problem for the Great Chamber, the children’s best 
interest is annulled by the particular interests of the majority and, consequently, the free 
development of their personality is not guaranteed. The promotion of a concrete 
ideology, if it is majoritarian, seems to be more important for the Court than the 
education in freedom. Under this proposition, the State can rightfully employ the 
education to promote the cultural homogenization of its population with no limits, and 
this behavior will not violate the freedom of conscience, even if it is clearly contrary to 
the pluralism that a democratic society needs to be considered as such. 
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The only interest of the Great Chamber building its argumentation is to conclude 
there is not proselytism in the exposition of a Christian symbol in the public space 
because this kind of icons cannot transmit any message, when this is, precisely, its 
natural function.  For this purpose, the Court has no problem to employ an equivocal 
concept of “secularism”, assimilating it to a rejection of any religious conviction (as the 
judge Power does in his concurring opinion) when the real meaning of the concept is 
neutrality. In the same way, it seems to be very concerned to avoid any concession to 
subjectivity, constantly seeking in its judgement objective reasons to cover up a 
suspicious approach. 
 
The first Lautsi judgement gave diffident principles for building a concept of 
children’s best interest with European scope, particularly in the educative environment, 
but the second one not only contains nothing relevant, but it complicates this task. The 
Great Chamber ruling also leaves in the vagueness the content and position of children’s 
rights in the European system. Finally, it changes the previous doctrine about religious 
symbols at school, based in the need for neutrality, without giving any substantive 
argument, which is not very correct under the point of view of the legal argumentation 
and makes almost impossible to integrate all the ECtHR judgments about religious 
symbols at school in a consistent doctrine. 
 
If the final solution is that every State can adopt the measures it considers 
without any restriction and individual rights cannot operate as a limit when the margin 
of appreciation is invoked, the only thing people can reasonably do is to ask what the 
ECtHR is for. At the end, the impression is that if the exposed symbol had belonged to 
any other religion different to Christianity, the conclusion would have been different in 
the interest of neutrality and pluralism. In any case, the Court has lost a good 
opportunity to take the children’s rights seriously. 
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